This article sets out to critique India's security discourse surrounding the "surgical strikes" of September 2016, using the theoretical framework provided by Secondly, I suggest that the Copenhagen School's emphasis on the subjective nature of security and on the normative preferability of de-securitisation offers valuable insights on the empirical stalemate that is the Kashmir conflict.
This article sets out to critique India's security discourse surrounding the "surgical strikes," using the theoretical framework provided by securitisation. It aims to answer two central questions: First, can securitisation theory provide fresh empirical insights on India's conflict with Pakistan over J&K that have been overlooked by more traditional approaches to security studies? Secondly, in what way can this case further our understanding of securitisation and thus contribute to the development of the theory?
In this article, I have argued that, much like a two-act play, India's securitisation of the Pakistani threat occurred in two distinct (speech) acts. The first illocutionary move preceded the extraordinary measure of Indian troops crossing the Line of Control (LOC) separating Indian-and Pakistani-administered J&K, which the two countries agreed not to breach in the Simla Agreement of 1972 (Indian Ministry of External Affairs 1972). The second speech act followed this action and occurred when the Indian state uttered the words "surgical strikes." This defies securitisation theory's chronological structure, which posits that the speech act always precedes the implementation of an exceptional measure. It is remarkable that these two distinct speech acts were used to justify a single extraordinary action of crossing the LOC to conduct "surgical strikes." There is little reason to believe this is a phenomenon that is limited to non-Western contexts, and in that sense the article does not claim to contribute to this special issue's theoretical agenda of widening the theory to better explain phenomena in the non-West. However, it does claim to have uncovered an interesting case of securitisation that does not fit the theory's linear pattern, through its application of the theory to an empirical case in the non-Western world. In this sense, the article widens securitisation theory by arguing for the possibility of a double speech act that both precedes and follows the extraordinary action-whether in the West or non-West.
Secondly, I suggest that the Copenhagen School's emphasis on the subjective nature of security and on the normative preferability of de-securitisation offers important insights on the empirical stalemate that is the Kashmir conflict.
Securitisation theory reveals the subjective nature of India's perception that Pakistan's claim to J&K is an existential threat to India's survival as a state and a nation. In praxeological terms, de-securitisation shows Indian policymakers that they could choose not to securitise the issue and to deal with it through political means instead.
The insight about security being subjective is not limited to the securitisation approach; it is, rather, a more general understanding of security within critical security studies. However, securitisation theory takes this point further by arguing that if an issue can be securitised through discourse, it can, equally, be de-securitised through a shift in discourse. There is a general dearth of critical studies of security in South Asia-analyses of security dynamics in the region tend to be informed by realist approaches. This article contributes to the literature on South Asian security by applying a critical approach such as securitisation to the longstanding India-Pakistan conflict, and more specifically, by highlighting the value of securitisation theory's emphasis on de-securitisation for policymaking on the Indian subcontinent.
The remainder of this article is organised into five sections. The first section outlines the contours of securitisation theory and the challenges scholars have encountered in attempting to apply the theory to cases outside the Western world. In the second section, I critically analyse the statements Indian government representatives made in the aftermath of the Uri attack, demonstrating how these speech acts represented securitising moves that sought to construct a threat emanating from Pakistan. The third section considers the Indian operation in Pakistaniadministered J&K, and reflects on whether the widespread use of the ambiguous term "surgical strikes" constituted a second speech act. In the fourth section, I argue that the Copenhagen School's normative preference for de-securitisation offers valuable empirical insights on the seemingly intractable conflict over J&K. Finally, a concluding section pulls together the key findings of the article.
Securitisation Theory, Democratic Bias, and the World's Largest Democracy Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998, 1) justify their development of the concept of securitisation based on the widening of security studies by critical scholars to include non-military threats. Although they are in basic agreement with this widening move, they postulate that there are "intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word security onto an ever wider range of issues."
To address this problem, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998, 23-24) reconceptualise "security" as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics." They posit that for something to count as a security issue, it has "to be staged as [an] existential threat[] to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 5) . This process is what the Copenhagen School refers to as securitisation.
Thus, securitisation theory contains six key concepts: the securitizing actor (i.e. the agent who presents an issue as a threat through a securitizing move), the referent subject (i.e. the entity that is threatening), the referent object (i.e. the entity that is threatened), the audience (the agreement of which is necessary to confer an intersubjective status to the threat), the context and the adoption of distinctive policies ("exceptional" or not) (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 495) . Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998, 22-23 ) put forward five sectors in which securitisation may take place. These include the military, the political, the economic, the societal and the environmental. They suggest that in the international context, "security is about survival," and securitisation occurs "when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society)" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 21) . Thus, at the international level of analysis, securitisation "means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 29) .
Several scholars have argued that securitisation theory contains a European bias (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 507; Vuori 2008, 65-66) . Wilkinson (2007, 5) , for instance, contends that the theory assumes "that European understandings of society and the state are universal." Greenwood and Waever (2013, 485-500) expand the concern about Eurocentrism to one of West-centrism; they apply the theory to Egypt in the context of the Arab Spring and find that the theory assumes a basic level of stability for there to be such a thing as normal politics. In Egypt during the Arab Spring, the whole situation was exceptional, leaving no room for normal politics. This, for Greenwood and Waever (2013, 501) , suggested a Western bias in the theory, because, in their words, "Western societies no longer confront (nor de facto run their politics on real expectations of) this kind of ultra-political moment."
Similarly, Holbraad and Pederson (2012, 193 ) take exception to securitisation theory's distinction between "ordinary and special politics," which, they argue, assumes a rule-based order and reveals the theory's liberal ontological underpinnings. Holbraad and Pederson (2012, 168-94) clarify that their point is not that securitisation theory "applies best to liberal democracies (although this may be the case), but that it involves certain political ontological premises associated with liberalist thought," which is problematic when studying non-Western contexts where the form of governance is non-liberal, such as their case study of Cuba. Vuori's (2008, 69) perspective contrasts with that of Holbraad and Pederson (2012) , in that he points out "that all societies have 'rules,' [which] are products of historical and social contingencies." He also differs from Holbraad and Pederson in his clear articulation of the democratic bias within securitisation theory, arguing that scholars have understood securitisation to be a way "of moving certain issues beyond the democratic process of government" (Vuori 2008, 66 ). Vuori's (2008, 66-68) point is that securitisation does take place in non-democratic settings, because all governments-democratic or non-democratic-require some amount of political legitimacy to survive.
The question of securitisation theory's success in explaining events in nondemocratic contexts is also addressed by Wilkinson (2007, 20) , who postulates that there may be limits to free speech in such contexts, "especially for non-state actors," which renders securitisation theory's linear construction and emphasis on the speech act problematic. Wilkinson (2007, 12) highlights the possibility that securitisation may take place through mediums other than speech, such as "words, images and actions."
In addition, she suggests that, Contrary to the linear dynamic described by securitization, starting with a securitizing actor who then constructs a referent object and threat narrative to be accepted or rejected, the process may in practice start at any point, with the component parts developing simultaneously and contributing to each other's construction (Wilkinson 2007, 20) .
For Wilkinson (2007, 22) , in fact, "'sufficient action' may replace or supplement the speech-act as the driving logic in the process of securitization."
In the context of these conversations about securitisation theory's Europeanand, more broadly, Western-assumptions, and whether the theory can unproblematically explain events in non-Western, non-liberal and non-democratic countries, India presents an interesting case. As shown above, scholars who have questioned the Western assumptions of securitisation theory have tended to focus on what happens when the theory is applied to non-democratic or non-liberal settings in the non-West. India, however, constitutes a case of a non-Western democratic state.
According to Mishra (2012, 33) , India is a non-liberal democracy, while Mitra (2013, 227) proposes that India has combined "western liberal democratic forms and nonwestern cultures." Thus, India provides an intriguing case for studying securitisation.
In the next section, I will employ securitisation theory to explore how political and military actors in India securitised the threat emanating from Pakistan in the aftermath of the September 2016 attack in Uri.
Act One: The Uri Attack
As noted above, the process of securitisation requires six elements: a securitising actor, a referent subject, a referent object, an audience, a context, and the legitimisation of "emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 25) . When the securitising actor frames the referent subject as an existential threat, this constitutes a securitising move.
However, for this securitising move to turn into a successful securitisation, it needs to be accepted by the audience (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 25) .
In the military sector, the most common referent object is the state and, more implicitly, the nation (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 36) . When the state is the referent object, the securitising actor is often also the state speaking "through its authorized representatives" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 42) . In this section I will show how the Indian state, through government officials, sought to frame Pakistan and Pakistan-based militants-the referent subject-as an existential threat to the Indian state and nation by appealing to an audience consisting of the citizens of India. I do so by referring to official statements made after the attack in Uri, relying on the Indian news media, the Twitter accounts of government officials, and an Indian adding that "the terrorists had some items with Pakistani markings." He said he had "spoken to Pakistan DGMO and conveyed our serious concerns" (Indian Defence Review 2016).
Then, on 26 September, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj used her speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as an opportunity "to askwho is behind this and who benefits from it? Terrorists do not own banks or weapons factories, so let us ask the real question: who finances these terrorists, who arms them and provides sanctuaries?" More directly, Swaraj declared:
In our midst, there are nations that still speak the language of terrorism, that nurture it, peddle it, and export it. To shelter terrorists has become their calling card. We must identify these nations and hold them to account. These nations, in which UN declared terrorists roam freely, lead processions and deliver their poisonous sermons of hate with impunity, are as culpable as the very terrorists they harbour. Such countries should have no place in the comity of nations.
To alleviate any doubts as to which nation she was referring to, Swaraj went on to complain that Pakistan had responded to India's friendly overtures with "Pathankot, Bahadur Ali, and Uri," and spoke about "Pakistan's complicity in cross-border terror" aimed at "obtain[ing] the territory it covets . . . Jammu and Kashmir" (Indian Express 2016c).
Thus, representatives of the executive and military branches of the Indian government used a combination of speech and words to frame Pakistan-based militant groups and, by extension, the Pakistani state as a threat to the Indian state.
The securitising actor was, thus, the Indian state, speaking through its authorised representatives. Mukherjee's assertion that "India w[ould] not be cowed down by such attacks," and Jaitley's reference to the "menace in our country" suggest that the Indian state was also the referent object. Mukherjee referred to "the evil designs of terrorists," and Ranbir Singh to "Jaish-e-Mohammed tanzeem," indicating that the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) militant group was being framed as the referent subject. However, the discourse extended the referent subject to the Pakistani state, as is evident in Mukherjee's tweet about "terrorists and their backers," Rajnath Singh's comments about "Pakistan [being] a terrorist state" and "Pakistan's continued and direct support to terrorism and terrorist groups," Jaitley's remark about "our neighbour," and Ranbir Singh's mention of "Pakistani markings." Swaraj's rhetoric at the UNGA more systematically constructed Pakistan as the referent subject, as demonstrated by her utterances about "nations that still speak the language of terrorism, that nurture it, peddle it, and export it," "nations in which UN declared terrorists roam freely, lead processions and deliver their poisonous sermons of hate with impunity," and "Pakistan's complicity in cross-border terror." Stern (2003, 108) , have access to other sources of funding, and "are no longer beholden to a single sponsor[, which] has emboldened them to the degree that they are prepared publicly to threaten Pakistan's leadership."
(De)constructing an Existential Threat
While the previous subsection established that the Indian state as a securitising actor constructed a threat to itself emanating from Pakistan and militant groups operating from its territory, it is not clear that an existential threat was being portrayed.
To comprehend the existential nature of the perceived threat, it is necessary to dig a little deeper, and to refer to Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde's (1998, 36) assertion that "[f]or a state, survival is about sovereignty, and for a nation it is about identity."
By assuming that it was another state, and not a non-state actor, that was the "real" perpetrator of the attack, the incident was framed as a violation of India's sovereignty over Indian-administered J&K. Furthermore, as Bose (2003, 9) explains, the Indian nationalist discourse considers Kashmir to be "India's atoot ang (integral part)," which signals that holding on to Kashmir has become a part of India's national identity. At her UNGA speech, Swaraj repeated the Indian refrain "that Jammu and
Kashmir is an integral part of India and will always remain so" (Indian Express 2016c).
Additionally, Snedden (2013, 221) points out that the Kashmir dispute is partly about "competing and irreconcilable ideas of nationhood, respectively based around the predominance of secularism or religion." His argument demonstrates why it is so important for India to maintain control of the Muslim-majority Kashmir region of J&K, which is where disgruntlement over the status quo is centred. Keeping Kashmir has something to do with India's identity as a secular state, and its ideological competition with the two-nation theory that is Pakistan's foundational doctrine, which insists that Muslims and Hindus comprise distinct nations (Ganguly 2015) .
In this way, the subtext of the Indian narrative following the Uri assault was that India's sovereignty and identity were being threatened. This implied threat to the survival of the Indian state and nation in their current form was understood by the intended audience of the Indian state's speech act: the Indian people. It is to this audience that the next subsection turns.
The Role of the Audience Although Swaraj addressed her UNGA speech to the member states of the United Nations, that is, to the international society of states, the primary audience for India's speech act was the citizens of India. This adheres to a common pattern observed by Vuori (2008, 72) , who notes that in most of the literature on securitisation,
it is "the citizens of a state" who are considered the audience for a securitising move.
The framework of securitisation theory predicates successful securitisation upon audience acceptance (Balzacq 2005, 173; Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 499; Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 25; Côté 2016, 542; Vuori 2008, 70) . In this sense, securitisation is conceived of as an inter-subjective process negotiated between the securitising actor and the audience (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 499; Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 26; Côté 2016, 541) . However, several authors have discerned a tension between the Copenhagen School's conceptualisation of securitisation on the one hand as a speech act, or a self-referential practice by the securitising actor, and on the other hand as an inter-subjective process involving both the securitising actor and the audience (Balzacq 2005, 177; Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 501; Côté 2016, 542) . It has been argued that although the Copenhagen School claims that the audience is essential to securitisation, the concept of the audience has been underdeveloped, the audience has effectively been ignored in the securitisation framework, and the theory consequently leans towards an understanding of securitisation as a self-referential practice in which the illocutionary act is sufficient to produce securitisation (Balzacq 2005, 177; Côté 2016, 542) .
The identification of this problem leads to a distinction between active and passive audiences. Côté (2016, 551) argues that while the theoretical literature on securitisation characterises "the audience as a passive receiver of security arguments," in fact, "audiences are active participants in securitization processes with the potential to undertake independent actions that can produce tangible security effects. " Vuori (2008, 70) introduces the idea of "active passivity" on the part of the audience, suggesting that while elections are one way of determining the audience's support for a securitising move, a lack of support can be demonstrated through protests, riots, revolts, coups, or non-participation. Audience inaction, on the other hand, indicates its acceptance of a securitisation. Balzacq (2005, 185) suggests that formal audience legitimation can be obtained through a vote in the national parliament or the United Nations Security Council, for example-although this contradicts the notion that securitisation conveys an urgency that allows "the normal bargaining processes of" politics to be transcended (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 4) .
In the case of the Indian state's securitisation of the threat from Pakistan, no parliamentary vote was held, but at the same time, there were no signs of dissent from the populace, even after the army announced its "surgical strikes." Balzacq (2005, 186) points to the importance of "collective memory and the Zeitgeist condition" in determining "how a given community perceives and symbolizes urgency," while Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998, 60) 
Act Two: The Surgical Strikes
Following the Indian state's speech acts of 18-26 September, which occurred in the context of the 18 September Uri attack and the general volatility of the Kashmir valley since July, the Indian DGMO announced on 29 September that, Based on receiving specific and credible inputs that some terrorist teams had positioned themselves at launch pads along Line of Control to carryout infiltration and conduct terrorist strikes inside Jammu and Kashmir and in various metros in other states, the Indian Army conducted surgical strikes at several of these launch pads to pre-empt infiltration by terrorists (Indian Express 2016b).
In this section, I argue that this reference to terrorist "launch pads," imminent "terrorist strikes" and the Indian army's "surgical strikes" constituted a second speech act that followed the extraordinary action of Indian troops crossing the LOC. First, The NIA concluded that the children had run away from home after arguing with their parents about schoolwork and accidentally crossed the LOC, although the authorities had previously said that the children had confessed to working for the JEM. The confession was brought into question when the Lashkar-e- Taiba (LET) claimed responsibility for the attack, and the NIA decided that it was, indeed, the LET, and not the JEM, that was the perpetrator (Scroll.in 2016a; Swami 2017) .
The second speech act, then, involved the same securitising actor-the Indian state speaking through its representative-and referent subject-Pakistan. The mention of a threat not only to "Jammu and Kashmir," but also to "various metros in other states," suggested that the referent object encompassed all the states of India, or the totality of the Indian state. That Ranbir Singh's statement was addressed to the Indian press indicates that the audience, too, was still the Indian people.
This second speech act was notable for two reasons. First, it followed the action, whereas securitisation theory assumes a linear progression from speech act to action.
Secondly, the use of the phrase "surgical strikes" produced a special kind of speech act, as I will show below. release on 29 September, the ISPR declared:
There has been no surgical strike by India, instead there had been cross LOC fire initiated and conducted by India which is existential phenomenon. . . . The notion of surgical strike linked to alleged terrorist bases is an illusion being deliberately generated by Indian to create false effects. This quest by Indian establishment to create media hype by rebranding cross border fire as surgical strike is fabrication of truth (Inter Services Public Relations 2016). a 'weapon of mass destruction'? and new to most people (how many people were familiar with 'ethnic cleansing' before it became a stock phrase in the 1990s?)"
Despite its ambiguity, Guruswamy (2016) observed that "the term 'surgical strikes' has dominated prime-time debates, social media chatter and dinner-table conversations." Unwittingly, Guruswamy was echoing Oren and Solomon (2015, 324) , who posit that
[s]ecuritisation succeeds when the "mantras" repeated by securitising actors in speeches and news releases jump to the pages of the print media, skip into the wording of frequently-asked and widely-reported opinion poll questions, reverberate through talk shows, news broadcasts, and other electronic media programming, echo throughout the blogosphere, and, increasingly in recent years, flood the social media. Mediated by these media forms, the securitising phrase infiltrates and even infects everyday talk, including, for example, dinner party conversations, chatter around water coolers, and discussions in school and college classrooms.
The fact that India is a multilingual country where a multitude of languages are spoken could have potentially impeded the securitising effect of the English phrase "surgical strikes." However, it is common for Indians to speak more than one language and to creatively combine languages in everyday parlance, and a scan through Hindi news sources suggests that the local-language news media adopted the English terminology of the "surgical strikes" (Aaj Tak Thus, to paraphrase Oren and Solomon (2015, 316) , the collective incantation of the phrase "surgical strikes" by the Indian administration, media and public as a ritualistic choral chant served to securitise the Pakistani state after the exceptional measure of breaching the LOC had taken place. The Indian army's depiction of terrorists at their "launch pads" on the verge of crossing over into Indian territory constructed a threat that retroactively justified the "surgical strikes," even as the Pakistani state denied they had ever taken place. This leads to the question-did they 
Desecuritising the India-Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir
For Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998, 4-29) , de-securitisation-"the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere"-is the ideal in the long run. Securitisation theory, with its understanding that security is subjectively determined by actors, and that securitising an issue or accepting a securitisation is a political choice, opens up the possibility for such a transformation from securitisation to normal politics (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 29-31) .
In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict over J&K, a shift from security politics to normal politics would involve engaging in a political dialogue over the issue with the aim of resolving it through "the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 4 Despite the seemingly obvious advantages of actively pursuing peace, the key actors in the conflict continue to neurotically reproduce patterns of destructive behaviour. This substantiates Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde's (1998, 70) claim that historical, geographical and political factors can combine to create a mutually reinforcing pattern of securitisation that is difficult to dislodge.
Browning and Joenniemi (2017) link the challenge posed by entrenched cases of securitisation to the concepts of self, identity and ontological security. They explain that most of the literature on ontological security assumes that international actors "prefer stability and certitude to change, [and] are therefore liable to reassert established patterns of behaviour, routines and identities, rather than embrace change precisely because of the perceived need and value of maintaining stable self-concepts" (Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 31-32) . Thus, states may prefer that a conflictual relationship continue, "because the enduring conflict reaffirms a sense of certainty about the identity of both oneself and the other" (Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 34) .
While this explanation seems to encapsulate the unending Pakistan-India conflict, Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 35) are clear that an actor needs to be able to sometimes deal with change and to adapt its identity, rather than neurotically holding on to a conflictual but stable situation. The literature Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 37) critique suggests that with long-running conflicts (such as Kashmir), the possibility of arriving at a rational resolution becomes diluted by the fact that the conflict has "come to frame the identities of the parties," while " we do, will we any longer be who we think we are."
However, these arguments are problematic for Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 38) because they naturalise securitisation. Like Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998), Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 38) insist that there are always options other than securitisation. They suggest that securitisation can cause as much anxiety as desecuritisation, because the initial process of securitisation marks a shift "from a former situation when identity was not securitized and was more open." Securitisation "entails a movement of rigidifying, closing down and bordering," while "desecuritizations may actually suggest the existence of a self possessing the reflexive ability to step back, employ alternative channels of articulation and opt for some other identity-abilities . . . that are actually precisely at the heart of ontological security" (Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 39) .
In South Asian philosophical terms, Indian Sufi sheikh Hazrat Azad Rasool (2002, 35) points to the potential for positively transforming the self when he writes, "When one has transformed the lower self (an-nafs an-ammārah), the beauty one perceives and the love one feels is comprehensive, energizing, and spiritually fulfilling." Singers such as Pakistan's Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan (1989 and 1992) 
Conclusion
This article makes two main contributions. On the theoretical side, it has shown that securitisation can sometimes occur through not one, but two speech acts. This was demonstrated by arguing that the Indian state securitised its traditional enemy, Pakistan, through a securitising discourse that preceded the implementation of the extraordinary measure of Indian soldiers crossing the LOC. This was then followed by a second speech act that both described and justified the exceptional action by once again constructing an existential threat.
At the empirical level of analysis, I have argued that if India's perception of an existential threat emanating from Pakistan's claim to J&K is understood as subjective, then Indian policymakers have the political choice of opting to pursue a path of desecuritisation. I have suggested that moving the issue from the realm of security to the political negotiating table would enhance rather than detract from India's (and Pakistan's) sense of security.
In addition to these two central claims, the article makes several observations that contribute to the literature on securitisation as well as the Pakistan-India conflict over Kashmir. First, it notes that Indian officials used a combination of speech and words (in the form of Twitter posts) to convey their securitising narrative to their audience, supporting Wilkinson's (2007) point about the Copenhagen School's overemphasis on speech. Secondly, it draws on Oren and Solomon (2015) to show that the words "surgical strikes," through their vagueness, themselves constituted a speech act that involved the securitising actor and audience joining in the ritualistic chanting of the ambiguous phrase. By applying Oren and Solomon's idea to a multilingual context, the article demonstrates that catchy phrases can be effectively deployed by securitising actors even in linguistically diverse non-Western contexts.
Thirdly, the article suggests that the resistance of the Kashmir conflict to resolution is a result of the identities of the Indian and Pakistani states becoming dependent upon their conflictual relationship. Even so, I have argued, Browning and Joenniemi (2017) are right to highlight the potential actors possess to flexibly adapt their identities, and this is not a new idea for Indians and Pakistanis, as I have revealed through my references to Sufi literature from the subcontinent.
